Guest post: How to Handle Tough Situations Like an Army Pilot
By Clay Huston
This week we’ll be doing something a bit different. I’d like to introduce my friend Clay Huston, who writes his own Substack-based newsletter breaking down how people think—and how some people manage to pull off things the rest of us might see as impossible. He’s a Blackhawk Helicopter pilot in the Army, so he’s no stranger to the aerospace concepts we explore here, and he’s had to manage them in the real world more than most. This week we’ll take a look at his piece on being a pilot, and having to process massive amounts of information to ensure you’re prepared for every outcome. Take some time to read through his insight and go ahead and subscribe if you like his stuff—I’m sure you will.
-Matt
I hate how reading the book ruins the movie
And even worse, when I can't enjoy a movie because I notice all the inaccuracies. Which is a side effect of knowing too much about a topic. After nine years in the Army, I have a hard time getting through war flics that botch the uniforms. I can't stand seeing tops without name tapes, trashy berets, and out of reg haircuts.
That said, it's refreshing when a movie gets the details right. I love watching a scene that realistically portrays a series of events. To me, It highlights the research and work the writers and producers put into the film. It makes me appreciative of the art form.
One great example is the first crash scene in Blackhawk Down. In the scene below, Super 61 takes an RPG to the tail rotor and spins out of control all the way to the crash site.
From the beeping tone of the stabilator failure caution to the pilot calling for the PCLs (power control levers) to be "pulled offline", to the arrest of the yaw right before touchdown as the pilots complete the emergency procedure, it's not perfect, but overall, the writers nailed it.
As you can see from the clip, those pilots had a lot going on. Their senses were overloaded and their blood pressure undoubtedly elevated. They were flying in a hot, uncomfortable environment, with unsecured passengers, and Somalians scurrying underneath. Kicked-up dust likely obscured the ground, making it difficult to spot hostiles below. The pilots and their crew had to be on constant watch for threats that could bring them down.
As if keeping an eye out for the enemy isn't arduous enough, those pilots had to track other things that can be just as threatening. Things that are tracked on every flight, not just ones in the desert. Here are a few additional inputs those pilots had to manage during that fateful flight:
wind direction
fuel flow
gross weight
engine RPM
engine oil pressure
transmission oil pressure
rotor RPM
speed
altitude
3-4 different radio frequencies as well as internal comms
current descent or ascent
engine torque
vertical obstacles
time and distance to the next point on the route
time to touch down
distance from other aircraft in formation
How could any pilot manage that much information and simultaneously attempt to fly out of a tail rotor failure? Yet, that is the expectation. Emergencies have prescribed procedures, and pilots are expected to memorize them and perform them instinctively.
But not every emergency is black and white. Many times, it's up to pilot judgment to assess and diagnose a problem. Only moments after Super 61 went down, Super 64 was struck by an RPG in roughly the same place as 61. 64 was able to maintain flight for a few minutes before they experienced a total loss of the tail rotor. Super 64's pilots observed their situation and determined they still had controllability in the tail rotor. They decided to return to the airfield to inspect the aircraft. Had they known their tail rotor was on the brink of a catastrophic failure, they likely would have landed as soon as possible.
In the case of a tail rotor failure, there is no cockpit indication in the Blackhawk that tells you the problem. For Super 61, the problem was obvious. A crewmember called out RPG on the ground. Then, there was an explosion, and the aircraft yawed hard and fast to the right. There aren't many things that cause a hard right yaw other than tail rotor failure. But for Super 64, the problem did not immediately present itself. The pilots did their best with what information they had but failed to ascertain the severity of their situation. There is no emergency procedure that could have kept Super 64 in the air. Only a more correct diagnosis.
Such is the case for most emergencies. Emergency procedures can only do so much for a pilot.
The Army has an institutional understanding of this. It knows that disasters are avoided when pilots take time to think through symptoms and diagnose a malfunction. Not by rashly speeding through an emergency procedure. For that reason, Army pilot training programs are designed to not only teach hard skills, but also develop pilot judgment. They turn you into skilled multitaskers as well as intelligent decision-makers.
For the most part, a pilot's judgment is honed through experience. But I'm about to spell out a few tricks we use that speed up and improve pilot judgment. Tricks that make tough situations just a little bit easier and increase our chances of coming out unscathed. Some are taught in flight school and used across all aviation units. Others vary and are specific to unit SOP, because different units have different missions.
These tools apply to more than just emergency situations. We use them to help decide any course of action. What do you do in bad weather, sick passengers, or unexpected severe turbulence? Our training helps us quickly arrive at the best answer to all those questions and more.
Here are four things that help U.S. Army Pilots handle tough situations:
Keep the Context in Mind
By context, I mean the details of the mission. In the assault helicopter world, what happens on the ground drives what happens in the air. An Assault Helicopter Batallion's "customer" is the ground force they're supporting. So, the plan the pilots develop depends on the needs of the ground force commander.
The ground force commander decides things like:
time on target
pick up zone
minimum number of troops
equipment
landing zone
These criteria are factored into mission planning and products. Before every mission we create mission packets that contain:
infil and exfil routes
time-distance-heading cards
strip maps of the routes
mission timeline cards
commo cards
pilot duty matrix
pickup and landing zone diagrams
inadvertent IMC card
This information synchronizes all pilots taking part in the mission. And it sets the context for the entirety of the mission, from start to finish.
With that context, certain questions answer themselves, and decision-making gets easier.
Take this example: Blackhawks can fit 11 passengers. Say the ground force commander wants 44 troops infilled. We would plan the mission for 4 birds. But min force (minimum number of troops needed to complete the mission) is 30. That answers the question of "what do we do if a bird breaks before infil?". We simply continue the mission. 3 birds with 11 troops each meets the min force of 30.
The context is also derived from where and when we're operating. Many regions of airspace have ROZs (restricted operating zone) that may or may not be active during a mission. If we must deviate from the planned route during a mission, an active ROZ could limit our options. Fewer options simplifies the decision. If we can't go right, we obviously must go left. But we only know if a ROZ is active if we confirm the times and dates it's scheduled. Which is all a part of building the context for any operation.
Stay Ahead of the Aircraft, But Not too Ahead
This is something you won't find written in any Army regulation, pamphlet, or technical manual. It's pilot lore that applies to civilian and military aviators alike.
It means thinking ahead to what's next and preparing for it. A great example is figuring what type of entry into a holding pattern you'll perform before arriving. A holding pattern is a racetrack-shaped flight path that ATC (air traffic control) gives you in order to sequence aircraft for landing or allow more time to descend.
There are three types of entries into a holding pattern: Parallel, teardrop, and direct. Which entry performed depends on the outbound heading of the pattern, and your heading prior to entry. It's tough to determine the entry in your head and requires a few moments of thought. So, most pilots will determine which entry to perform miles before they arrive. Staying ahead of the aircraft and knowing your entry ensures you perform a nice, clean holding pattern. Which makes you look good to ATC.
But you don't want to get too far ahead of the aircraft. That will unnecessarily increase your present workload. It’s silly to waste time and mental bandwidth working on a task that is less critical than another.
Staying ahead of the aircraft helps to keep things simple in case something changes unexpectedly. It's a conservative approach to cockpit management. You could also look at it as balancing your workload across the duration of the flight. You don't want too much work at the beginning, middle, or end.
Know the Contingency Plans
Army aviation units have contingency plans for many scenarios. Most apply to multiship operations. Things like a lost communication contingency are vital to completing a multiship mission. Losing comms with the other helicopters in your formation can derail a mission in seconds. Especially if the silent bird is carrying the air mission commander or ground force commander.
But arguably the most important contingency plan is inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC). Fancy name, but it's really simple; What do you do in the event you unexpectedly lose sight of the ground?
IIMC training is some of the most important training any pilot, military or civilian, can receive. It's so vital and life-saving because of the risk of disorientation that comes with inadvertently losing ground reference. It's nearly impossible to know if you're in a bank, climb, or descent if you're in a cloud and can't see the ground. Unless, of course, you're trained to fly by the instruments. Instrument-based flight is not easy and requires an extreme amount of focus. Simultaneously cross monitoring your altitude, speed, attitude, climb or descent, and the appropriate radios is a bear.
Now, imagine going IIMC during a multi-ship operation. Do you think you could coordinate the headings and altitudes of 6 Blackhawks on the fly? No, that's impossible, and asking for a disaster. It's too much work to do on the spot. That's why every pilot must have the IIMC contingency memorized. They must know that upon going IIMC each aircraft turns 10 degrees times their chalk number to the clear side and climbs 500 feet above the aircraft in front of them. Any delay in executing this contingency increases the risk of a mid-air collision.
IIMC contingency plans are specific to unit SOP as well as the area of operation. Designated IIMC altitudes are selected based on the highest obstacle in the area. So, the altitude you climb to after going IIMC won’t be the same everywhere. Just another reason to keep the context in mind.
Share the Workload
All Army aircraft are two pilot for a reason. Managing the cockpit and flying the aircraft is just too much for any one person. Task saturation is a real threat and can be debilitating. The best way to combat task saturation is by distributing the workload between the two pilots.
The Army spells out which pilot handles what duties in our pre-flight crew brief. But in the end, the cockpit belongs to the Pilot in Command and they're responsible for assigning duties. The crew chiefs in the back get involved too. They're in charge of any passengers and are critical for obstacle avoidance, especially at low altitudes. Every crew member has a role and should be fully utilized. One pilot micro-managing the aircraft makes for a sloppy and stressful flight.
During multi-ship missions, the workload is distributed across multiple aircraft as well. Inside the cockpit, one pilot might be dedicated to navigation and radios, while the other does all the flying. Outside the cockpit, among the other ships in formation, tasks are delineated according to a pilot-duty matrix. Typically, the first ship navigates and handles all ATC calls. The second ship prepares the weather brief and the third ship makes air-to-air radio calls. The more aircraft there are in formation, the fewer duties each aircraft has.
All that is to avoid task saturation which leads to bad decisions. A fair distribution across multiple ships and between crewmembers ensures that no one is overworked.
Conclusion
That's how we handle tough situations; We prepare for them.
When it comes down to it, most decisions an Army pilot makes are made before ever starting an engine. Good preparation is what makes a good flight, as well as not taking on too much at one time. Pilots must know their limits. Nothing good comes from biting off more than you can chew, or "outflying your abilities" as we like to say.
It’s incidents like Blackhawk Down that have reformed the way the Army trains its pilots. Every year, more and more emphasis is placed on crew coordination and the implementation of a “words mean things” culture. The Army sees the value in making sure pilots are clear, precise communicators. Which is an obvious necessity. When you’re flying 100 miles per hour, 50 feet above the trees, you better make sure everything you say is going to be perfectly understood by who receives it.
Lessons learned from overseas and domestic accidents continue to teach us how to better handle tough situations. NTSB reports and military crash investigations are routinely distributed to aviation units and are discussed during pilot forums. Accidents are a serious issue to us, and safety is not some nerdy mantra, it’s a skill unto itself.
So cool! You guys rock!